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I. INTODUCTION 
Price stability is the main objective of central banking. While they face a multiplicity of 
policy objectives, central banks have a clear mandate to maintain long term price stability 
through the use of appropriate policy instruments. For the case of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), it is officially stated that “the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to 
maintain price stability” (Article 2, Protocol 4, Statute of the ESCB and ECB). The main 
policy tool to achieve this target is the interest rate. Since the early 1990s an increasing 
number of central banks have adopted explicit inflation targets as a way to anchor 
expectations. Since then, inflation targeting has become an addition to the central banker’s 
toolkit. Even though empirical evidence in not conclusive (Arestis et al., 2014), inflation 
targeting is considered to be part of the conventional wisdom relating to optimal 
monetary policy (Woodford, 2004).  
 While the ECB has not adopted any explicit target, eurozone monetary policy has 
focused on a target of 2% inflation. Since its establishment in 1999, the ECB has kept 
inflation rates below the 2% target for much of the period after the adoption of the Euro 
with some exceptions such as the period after 2007. Figure 1 shows the inflation 
performance of the Eurozone as well as the corresponding one for the US. From the 
creation of Euro until late 2007, the ECB was quite successful in keeping the inflation rate 
close to 2%. The only exception was the first quarter of 2008 where inflation increased 
above this target. For the case of the US, the inflation rate reached a maximum of 5.6% in 
July 2008. After the onset of the global financial crisis, inflation rates showed a significant 
fall. Since late 2009 the global economic recovery has coincided with an increase of the 
inflation rate. However, the European sovereign crisis has exacerbated policy concerns as 
it has contributed significantly to widespread deflation in the Eurozone since 2012.  
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Figure 1 
US & Eurozone Inflation rates 
 
Note: Annual CPI Inflation Rates downloaded from Datastream.  
   
 In December 2014 the inflation rate dropped below 0% (Figure 1). This deflationary 
process was reinforced by the adoption of pro-cyclical fiscal policies (De Grauwe, 2016). 
This led the ECB to undertake further action by adopting quantitative easing since March 
2015. These events highlighted the role of fiscal policy in a monetary union. Long before 
the outbreak of the European sovereign crisis, part of the literature has already examined 
the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies in monetary unions.1 For instance, 
Hughes Hallett and Weymark (2007) show the importance of fiscal leadership followed 
by an independent central bank. Furthermore, the presence of centralised monetary 
policy along with the decentralised fiscal policies has addressed new policy questions. 
Andersen (2008) stresses the importance of flexible inflation targeting in a monetary union 
where the multiple fiscal authorities tend to underestimate the role of the central 
monetary policy in the case of aggregated shocks.   
  Another part of the related literature examines the transmission of inflation 
dynamics among different units. This area has been the focus of both theoretical 
                                                     
1 See Foresti (2018) for a recent survey.  
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(Chowdhury et al., 2006; Holman and Rioja, 2001; Tillmann, 2008) and empirical research.  
Jeong and Lee (2001) examine inflation dynamics among G7 economies for the period 
between 1957 and 1997. Analysing the variance decompositions, they find that the US and 
the UK are the main ‘transmitters’ of inflation innovations. Comparing the Bretton Woods 
with the post Bretton Woods period, their findings support Friedman’s (1953) argument 
according to which an inflationary shock can be much more easily absorbed under a 
flexible exchange rate regime. In a similar vein, Yang et al. (2006) provide evidence for 
broad linkage within inflation dynamics not only from the US to other economies, but 
also the other way round. In both studies, the main policy argument made is for better 
coordination of monetary policy. Due to international linkages, it is difficult for a single 
central bank to combat inflation effectively. This policy conclusion results from the fact 
that the focus was restricted to G7 economies. More recently, Jordan (2016) examines the 
effects of international inflation spillovers on Swiss inflation and Swiss Franc (CHF) 
nominal effective exchange rates. According to his findings, Switzerland has become a 
net receiver of shocks since 2008 and this explains Swiss deflation. Mumtaz and Surico 
(2012) examine the global and the country-specific factors of inflation rates for a panel of 
advanced OECD economies. Among their finding, they report a significant variation of 
these two factor categories through time, while their contributions vary across countries. 
Bianchi and Civelli (2015) also find that global fluctuations affect the dynamics of 
domestic inflation rates in 18 OECD countries. However, the role of these global factors 
does not seem to have significantly changed, at least as it would have expected from the 
globalisation process of the last thirty years. In a similar vein, Altansukh et al. (2017) 
examine the globalisation of core, energy and food inflation rates among 13 OECD 
countries supporting the view that policy makers should pay increasing attention to the 
movements of the foreign (imported) inflation.    
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 In this paper we focus on the process of inflation transmission between core and 
periphery members of the Eurozone. In particular, we examine the degree and the nature 
of monetary interconnections as measured by the extent of inflation shock transmission. 
The simultaneous existence of very low inflation in the core (0% for Germany) combined 
with deflation in some parts of the periphery (-1.1% for Spain and -0.3% in Italy)2 lead to 
new challenges for formulating optimal monetary policy for the Eurozone as a whole. We 
concentrate on five peripheral European countries: the so called GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain). We focus on these economies due to their key role during the 
recent sovereign debt crisis. In particular, Greece, Ireland and Portugal officially 
participated in bail-out programs, while Italy and Spain received financial support from 
the ECB for their banking sectors, which makes these countries important for such 
analysis. The core of the Eurozone is represented by Germany which is by far the largest 
economy within the Eurozone. 
 The contribution of this study is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study that examines inflation transmission between the Euro area core and the 
periphery. Through our analysis, we shed light on inflation linkages and the degree of 
interdependence across key parts of the European monetary union. Secondly, we extend 
variance decomposition methodology used previously (see, Yang et al., 2006) by applying 
spillover analysis developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014; 2015). Despite the simplicity 
of this method, its main advantage is the ability of identifying each country as a gross 
or/and net transmitter of inflationary shocks to other countries as well as a recipient of 
inflationary shocks from other countries. In this way, we are able to measure the 
bidirectional spillovers of shocks among the examined economies.   
Consequently, we provide evidence that can be useful in determining optimal monetary 
policy under conditions of very low inflation. Our results relating to inflation 
                                                     
2 ECB, Inflation dashboard, May 2016.  
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interconnectedness can be viewed as empirical complements to policy recommendations 
arising from the theoretical study of Eggertsson and Giannoni (2013). According to their 
analysis, an increase in inflation under a low interest rate environment can help boost the 
economy by promoting output growth. Even when the economy has fallen to a liquidity 
trap (Krugman, 1998), the monetary policy still plays an important role. For instance, 
strategic monetary-fiscal interactions remain an important policy nexus even under zero 
bound of interest rates (Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2011). In such an environment, precise 
information about the interconnectedness of inflation dynamics is essential for a 
functioning institutional design. By identifying the channels of transmissions, our 
evidence reveals the potentials effects of an inflation shock in a monetary union. The 
remaining paper is structured as follows: the next section presents the data and the 
methodology used. Section II outlines our results, while the last section summarises and 
concludes.   
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We use monthly data for the Harmonised Index of Consumer Price (HICP) provided by 
Eurostat. For the period under examination, viz. 1996:2-2015:8, the annualised monthly 
HICP series for all six countries are found to be stationary. For robustness purposes, we 
also employ inflation data obtained from an alternative source, the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) provided by the IMF. Our results remain unchanged. We employ HICP in 
our analysis since it is widely regarded as a more consistent measure of inflation. Figure 
2 shows the inflation rates of GIIPS and Germany since the climax of the sovereign debt 
crisis in late-20113. There is a clear declining trend of all inflation series, with Greece and 
Spain being in a deflationary phase for a prolonged period.  
                                                     
3 Since there is no clear consensus about the time-line of the European debt crisis, we consider as a distinguishing 
point the decision of the ECB to provide liquidity support through the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) 
program in December 2011 (see, Darracq-Paries and De Santis, 2015). 
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Figure 2 
Germany and GIIPS Inflation rates
 
  
Note: Annual Harmonised Index of Consumer Price (HICP) downloaded from Eurostat. 
 
In line with prior work (Eun and Jeong, 1999; Yang et al., 2006), we carry out 
variance decomposition of inflationary innovations. However, we extend and improve 
upon previous analysis by employing the spillover analysis proposed by Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2014; 2015). By doing so we are able to assess the shares of forecast error variation 
in several locations arising from inflation shocks that arise elsewhere. Specifically, this 
approach provides information about the contributions of shocks to variables to the 
forecast error variances for all the variables within the model. This model is briefly written 
as an N-variable VAR: 
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where 1 1 2 2 ...j j j p j p− − −Θ = Φ Θ +Φ Θ + +Φ Θ , with Θ being the NxN coefficient matrices. In 
this paper, we follow the work of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) in which they use the 
generalized VAR modelling approach. Under this framework, the variance 
decompositions are invariant to the variable ordering. More precisely, the ij entry of the 
H-step-ahead variance decomposition is equal to  
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where jjσ is the standard deviation of ε for the jth equation, Σ is the variance matrix of 
error vector epsilon. The drawback of the generalized VAR modelling is that the own and 
cross-variable variance contributions shares do not equal to one. This is addressed by 
using the following normalization:  
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Given the result above, the total spillover index (SI) is equal to: 
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The value of this index shows the average contribution of spillovers from shocks to all 
variables to the total forecast error variance. Alternatively, the spillover index gives the 
degree of connectedness of the K-variable system. In simpler terms, this index provides 
an overall measure of how interdependent the examined variables are. The main 
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advantage of this analysis is that the directional spillovers can also be easily calculated. 
More precisely, the directional spillovers received by variable i from all the other variables 
are defined as 
 1,
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Also, the directional spillover (DSI) transmitted by the variable i to all the other variables 
is defined as: 
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Finally, in order to examine whether a variable is net receiver or transmitter of shock, the 
net spillover effects (NSI) are calculated as follows: 
 i i j i jNSI DSI DSI→ ←= −   (8) 
 The measures described above are static. This means that they are calculated for 
the whole period under study. However, the period that we examine in this study 
contains certain sub-periods of special interest. Therefore, static analysis may omit several 
aspects of stress transmission. In order to address this limitation, we employ a dynamic 
version of spillover analysis using rolling estimation with a 60-month window. To test for 
robustness, we also experimented with 65, 70 and 75-month rolling windows. The results 
remain almost identical.   
 
III. RESULTS  
We begin our analysis by firstly estimating the static spillovers. The results are presented 
in Table 1 where the connectedness matrix is depicted. The main upper table is the 
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variance decomposition matrix. Each diagonal element (i,i) shows the percentage of 
forecast error variation due to a shock in the same variable (i). Accordingly, the non-
diagonal element (i,j) depicts the percentage of variation in variable i explained by a shock 
in variable j. As explained in the previous section, we focus on the bilateral relations of 
GIIPS economies with Germany. For example, the last row of the upper part of Table 1 
shows that an inflationary shock in Spain is responsible for 9% of the forecast error 
variance of Germany. On the other hand, a shock in Germany explains only a 3.7% of 
forecast error variance of Spain. In net pairwise terms, this is equivalent to claiming that 
Spain is a net transmitter of an inflationary shock to Germany ( Germany Spain Spain Germanyi i← ←− =9-
3.7=5.3%). The same is true for Italy. Specifically, a shock in Italy explains 7.4% of the 
forecast error variance of Germany, while a ‘German’ shocks explains only 3% of the 
‘Italian’ forecast error variance. In net pairwise terms, Italy is a net transmitter of 
inflationary shock to Germany ( Germany Italy Italy Germanyi i← ←− =7.4-3=4.4%).  A similar situation 
holds true for Portugal, which is found to be net receiver (as Germnay Portugal Portugal Germanyi i← ←−
=9.5-6.2=3.3%). The opposite is true for the case of Ireland and Greece. An inflation shock 
that takes place in Ireland explains only 5.3% of the German forecast error variance, while 
a shock in Germany explains 7.5% of the Irish variance. This means that Ireland in a net 
receiver of shocks from Germany ( Germany Ireland Ireland Germanyi i← ←− =5.3-7.5=-2.2). The same is true 
for Greece, where Germany Greece Greece Germanyi i← ←− =1-2.6=-1.6.  
  Apart from bilateral relations, Table 1 provides information about each economy’s 
overall percentage of variation. In particular, the bottom row of Table 1 shows the total 
contribution of each examined economy to other economies’ variation. Interestingly, 
Spain’s and Italy’s contribution is quite high reaching 93% and 84%, respectively. This 
indicates the important role of these two economies as transmitters of inflationary shocks 
to others. In contrast, the overall contribution of Germany to other countries is much 
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smaller with a value of 23%. In a similar vein, the last column shows the total contribution 
that each economy receives from the remaining ones. A high value indicates a high degree 
of ‘sensitivity’ to inflation shocks that take place elsewhere. Interestingly, Spain and Italy 
are highly susceptible to foreign inflation shocks, while simultaneously they are the main 
receivers of spillovers. The rest of the GIIPS economies also have high values (with Greece 
having the maximum value of 68%). Finally, the rightmost value in the last row of Table 
1 shows the overall interdependence of our system (equation 5). The total spillover index 
(57.4%) shows that more than half of the total forecast error variance of the six economies 
examined is explained by the connectedness of shocks across these countries. Even 
though we restrict our study to only a subset of Eurozone, we find that the level of 
interconnectedness is fairly high.   
 
Table 1  
Average Total Spillovers 
  Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Germany 
From 
Others 
Greece 31.8 17.1 19.4 8.1 21 2.6 68 
Ireland 10.8 46.4 11.1 10.4 13.8 7.5 54 
Italy 9.3 9.1 37.4 10.9 30.4 3 63 
Portugal 6.9 14.4 18.3 35.6 18.6 6.2 64 
Spain 9.1 10.8 28 11.8 36.6 3.7 63 
Germany 1 5.3 7.4 9.5 9 67.8 32 
Contribution to others 37 57 84 51 93 23 344 
Contribution including own 69 103 122 86 129 91 57.40% 
Note: Spillover indexes based on equations (5)-(7), calculated from variance decompositions based on 10-
step-ahead forecasts. 
              
The above analysis is useful but not precise enough. Its main drawback is that results 
found are static. This means that the analysis carried out does not take allow for any 
potential change in the relations among the examined economies. A dynamic analysis 
would therefore be much more informative. Static analysis may also omit several aspects 
of stress transmission. For this reason, we obtain a dynamic estimate of the above-
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mentioned measures using 60-month rolling regressions. Figure 3 shows the dynamic 
version of the total interdependence index (57.4%) discussed in the previous section. We 
find clear evidence for considerable variation over time with an increasing trend since the 
creation of Euro. As shown in Figure 3, the index increases from 50% to roughly 67.5% 
over the period under examination. This means that the system represented by GIIPS 
countries and Germany gradually becomes more and more interconnected over time. This 
is in line with theoretical expectations that countries become more interdependent under 
a new monetary regime arising from the adoption of a single currency.  
 
Figure 3 
Dynamic Spillovers 
                           
Note: Dynamic spillover index is calculated using rolling regressions with a 60-month window.  Shaded 
areas denote Eurozone recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee. 
 
The remaining figures (Figures 4-8) show the net pairwise spillovers between each 
periphery country vis-a-vis Germany which is considered to be net transmitter of inflation 
whenever the net effect lies below zero. On the other hand, if the net effect exceeds zero, 
Germany is a receiver of inflationary shocks. Starting from Greece (Figure 4), our results 
indicate that Greece remains an inflation transmitter for the longest period of time. This 
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is an interesting result, given the macroeconomic conditions prevailing in Greece 
including as a result of recent sovereign debt crisis.  However, since 2011 the net effect for 
Greece becomes almost zero, whilst by the end of 2013 Greece becomes an inflation 
receiver. As far as the Irish economy is concerned (Figure 6), before 2005 it was a net 
transmitter of inflation but after 2005 it became a net receiver. This seems to have changed 
from mid-2014 onwards. The picture is fairly clear for the three remaining countries 
(Figures 6-8). For almost the whole period examined net-pairwise spillovers for Italy, 
Portugal and Spain are positive indicating that they remain net transmitters of shocks to 
Germany. Overall, the dynamic analysis shows that until the most recent data used in our 
study (mid-2015), all periphery countries (with the exception of Greece) are net 
transmitter of inflation to the core.  
Figure 4 
Dynamic Net Pairwise Spillovers: Greece-Germany 
 
Note: Dynamic net-pairwise spillover index is calculated using rolling regressions with a 60-month 
window. Positive values indicate that Greece is a net transmitter to Germany. Shaded areas denote 
Eurozone recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.   
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Dynamic Net Pairwise Spillovers: Ireland-Germany 
 
Note: Dynamic net-pairwise spillover index is calculated using rolling regressions with a 60-month 
window. Positive values indicate that Ireland is a net transmitter to Germany. Shaded areas denote 
Eurozone recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.  
 
 
Figure 6 
Dynamic Net Pairwise Spillovers: Italy-Germany 
 
Note: Dynamic net-pairwise spillover index is calculated using rolling regressions with a 60-month 
window. Positive values indicate that Italy is a net transmitter to Germany. Shaded areas denote 
Eurozone recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.  
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Figure 7 
Dynamic Net Pairwise Spillovers: Portugal-Germany 
 
Note: Dynamic net-pairwise spillover index is calculated using rolling regressions with a 60-month 
window. Positive values indicate that Portugal is a net transmitter to Germany. Shaded areas denote 
Eurozone recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
Dynamic Net Pairwise Spillovers: Spain-Germany 
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Note: Dynamic net-pairwise spillover index is calculated using rolling regressions with a 60-month 
window. Positive values indicate that Spain is a net transmitter to Germany.  Shaded areas denote 
Eurozone recessions based on CEPR business cycle dating committee. 
 
 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCUSIONS   
This paper identifies the transmission channels of inflation between the periphery (GIIPS 
countries) and the core (Germany) of the Eurozone. Using spillover analysis and in 
conjunction with a dynamic estimation method, we contribute to the existing literature 
by providing new evidence on how shocks in inflation rates are transmitted across 
economies that share the same currency. According to our results, a potential shock in 
GIIPS countries can be transmitted to the core. For instance, a potential deflationary shock 
to the periphery can be transmitted to the core. In the symmetrical opposite case of an 
inflationary shock, our results suggest that GIIPS countries can ‘export’ inflation to the 
core. This result is highly significant considering the current deflationary environment 
within the European periphery, especially after the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. 
Given that peripheral economies can export deflation to the core, the need to combat 
deflation becomes more urgent. In an economic system like Eurozone, where one 
monetary authority controls monetary policy within a number of different economies, 
while fiscal policies are largely the preserve of national governments and not effectively 
coordinated within the Eurozone, the study of interconnectedness between periphery and 
core is essential. A positive inflation shock in the periphery, for instance through a 
mixture of expansionary fiscal policies, will be exported to the core. The current debates 
about the level of inflation in Germany (Nienaber, 2018) and its relation with the stance 
of fiscal policy, shows that proper identification of the inflation linkages needs deeper 
understanding.    
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  Another important policy implication is related to the nature of monetary policy 
itself. The conventional wisdom of long run commitment to price stability being the key 
to fighting inflation (e.g. Woodford, 2004) has to be re-examined under the new conditions 
prevailing within the core and periphery of the Eurozone. Contrary to the pre-crisis 
experience where positive inflation rates were the norm, the new post-crisis deflationary 
period leads to new challenges about what can be considered to be optimal monetary 
policy under conditions of both deflation and low growth. Overall, our empirical results 
suggest that the next challenge to Eurozone policy makers is to deal with deflation and 
its consequences for managing fiscal crises effectively. The dangers of debt-deflationary 
spiral require new policy responses from central banks. Under deflationary conditions the 
issue of inflation transmission and inflation dynamics are of significant policy interest. 
This is an important aspect, especially for the case of Eurozone, where one monetary 
authority controls monetary policy within a number of different economies, while fiscal 
policies are largely the preserve of national governments and not effectively coordinated 
within the Eurozone. One potential area for future research is disaggregating analysis as 
well as the modelling of inflation channels within the Eurozone. 
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